Commissioner's questions about election fraud in [county]

Commissioner's questions about election fraud in [county]
David Clements presents on May 7, 2023 in Monticello

A few readers emailed this presentation to their local officials, including commissioners.

One commissioner apparently watched the video but had this response:

Thank you for the note and video.  I watched it.  

I remain unsure how elections could be rigged in [county] at least at the machine level.  I do understand that the Ds Get Out to Vote system is much more organized and orchestrated than the [county] Rs but that is only because they have more money and will, in my opinion.  

At the end of the video this guy calls for paper ballots.  We have them.  We just count them on counters that read spots on white paper.  I don’t think we are returning to hand counting anytime soon.  We do it on a couple of random precincts each election and during formal recounts.  The difference in machine and hand counting is always a couple of votes one way or another.  I do not understand the facts about voter fraud happening in [county].  

Thanks again!  I hope you are doing well.

A response which can be tailored to your county and specific commissioners

A few comments and followup questions:


  1. Democrats more organized: The claim is made that Democrats have a better organized get-out-the-vote ground game, which may be true, however that is a theory that cannot be proven unless a true and proper audit is done of voter rolls, the cast vote records, paper ballots, and tabulator system logs.
  2. Post-election reviews in [county]: There is a claim that the post-election reviews in [county] have not turned up issues, and they are usually within a couple of votes. That is NOT good enough. If a financial analyst or accountant found even $1 off in the books, that would be cause for concern requiring a full audit to balance the books. Same goes for elections.
  3. Election fraud > Voter Fraud: Elections can easily be rigged at the machine level and at least two ways are shown in the presentation. It's a somewhat elegant way to subvert an election but not the only way. Jeffrey Lenberg and Mark Cook demonstrate two separate ways, both of which can occur without detection or logs being taken in the system—in other words a bad actor could adjust vote totals in the database before reporting official results. If proper audits which include audits of the paper ballots, cast vote records from the tabulators, system logs from the tabulators, and the voter registrations/histories are not done, then vote swaps as demonstrated by Lenberg and Cook would never be detected by election staff.

Follow-up questions:

  1. Voter registration: Who controls and manages [county]'s voter registration lists (voter rolls)? How often are these audited and are they made public? When was the last time registrations were updated once dead, duplicate, or phantom voter registrations were discovered?
  2. Voter validation: What qualifications do absentee ballot board members have? On the signature verification process for mail-in/absentee, what level of accuracy is acceptable if less than 100% for these election staff?
  3. Tabulation: Has the county considered a hand count side by side with machine counts on election night? If yes, why have they decided against it?
  4. Reporting: Why aren't precinct-level results reported to the public prior to sending up to the county (and then the state)? Wouldn't it be reasonable to immediately share results to the public at the local polling place?
  5. Audits of Paper and Tabulators: Since the county claims to have the paper ballots, would the county be prepared to do both an audit of the paper ballots (all of them) alongside releasing ALL cast vote record reports from 2020 and 2022 in addition to the system logs of ALL tabulators used in 2020 and 2022? This helps to ensure tabulators are interpreting voter intent accurately and also that tabulators are not tampered with between the logic & accuracy test and election day. All of these are tools, reports, and approaches [county] ALREADY HAS but which it has chosen not to use nor release to the public. It is hoped that doing so in the near future would go a long way toward transparency and learning whether or not elections were subverted in [county].
Droplets on tree branch… and a slightly broken segment clings to main